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I. INTRODUCTION
In April 2011, Theresa Kohutka, a twenty-four-year employee of the
Hempstead Animal Shelter on Long Island in New York, sued the Town
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Zarb School of Business, and Director, Center for Teaching and Scholarly Excellence,
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of Hempstead and five of her supervisors and coworkers.1 She claimed,
inter alia, that her First Amendment rights were violated when her
supervisor refused to promote her because she did not become more
active in the local Republican Club after he urged her to do so.2
This lawsuit should be surprising because the U.S. Supreme Court
seemed to settle the issue of using political affiliation to make employment
decisions in a series of three opinions more than twenty years ago.3
Nevertheless, cases on the issue continue to arise in significant numbers.
This is an unfortunate situation because the ensuing litigation creates an
expensive and unnecessary cost for cities and towns and their hardpressed taxpayers. Because there is no end in sight, this Article suggests
that it is time for the U.S. Supreme Court to revisit the issue and rethink
its prior positions.
First, this Article describes the development of the patronage and civil
service systems with a reflection on how they work in tandem. Then,
the trio of cases, Elrod v. Burns,4 Branti v. Finkel,5 and Rutan v.
Republican Party of Illinois,6 is reviewed. How the federal circuit courts
have responded to these three cases is examined both in their immediate
aftermath and in decisions in more recent cases. Finally, the Article
discusses some specific examples of how the current law creating First
Amendment rights against negative employment decisions for patronage
appointees is not working and how it should be changed.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PATRONAGE AND THE CIVIL SERVICE
A. The Patronage System
The patronage system has been described as “appointing persons to
government positions on the basis of political support and work rather
than on merit, as measured by objective criteria.”7 Patronage has been
1. Kohutka v. Town of Hempstead, No. 2:2011cv01882 (E.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 15,
2011); Will Van Sant, Veteran Worker Sues Town Animal Shelter, NEWSDAY, Apr. 19,
2011, at A11, available at 2011 WLNR 7592482; News Release, Hope for Hempstead
Shelter, Animal Shelter Worker Files Employment Discrimination Lawsuit Citing
Political Patronage Over Skill as Common Practice for Advancement (Apr. 19, 2011),
available at http://www.hopeforhempsteadshelter.com/PR_TOHAS_Kohutka%20Law
suit_4-19-11.pdf (alleging that a kennel supervisor position went to person active in the
Republican Party even though plaintiff scored highest on civil service exam).
2. Van Sant, supra note 1.
3. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445
U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion).
4. 427 U.S. 347.
5. 445 U.S. 507.
6. 497 U.S. 62.
7. Patronage Definition, THE FREE DICTIONARY: LEGAL DICTIONARY, http://legaldictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Political+patronage (last visited Aug. 13, 2012); see
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part of human history as long as people have been governing themselves.
There is evidence that the ancient Chinese were buying and selling
government jobs as long ago as 243 B.C.E.8 During the Roman Empire,
the emperor’s private army, the Praetorian Guard, sold the offices of
emperor, consul, patrician, and senator.9 When the monarchs of France
and Great Britain needed money or political support, they would sell
governmental honors and offices.10
By the time the U.S. Constitution was adopted, federal officeholders
very naturally appointed their supporters to government jobs and dismissed
opponents.11 The first patronage dismissal in the U.S. government
probably occurred in 1797 when the Secretary of the Treasury, a Federalist,
fired the U.S. Commissioner of Revenue, an ardent Republican.12 The
explanation for the dismissal suggests and foreshadows the ongoing,
rather guilty acceptance of the patronage system. The Treasury Secretary
reported that the reason for the dismissal was “deliberate misconduct in
office,” but the “misconduct” consisted of aiding Republican opponents.13
Presidents Washington and Adams, both Federalists, appointed Federalists
to government positions; President Jefferson, a Republican-Democrat

also WEBSTER’S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 1315 (2d ed. 1978) (defining patronage as “the power to appoint to office
or grant other favors, especially political ones”); Patronage Definition, MERRIAMWEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/patronage (last visited
Aug. 13, 2012) (defining patronage as “the power to make appointments to government
jobs especially for political advantage” and “the distribution of jobs on the basis of
patronage”).
8. William Keisling, Hell to Pay: Patronage in Crisis, An Excerpt from When the
Levee Breaks by Bill Keisling (2007), http://www.yardbird.com/levee_breaks_5_
pa_turnpike_patronage.htm; see also Audrey Hu & Liang Zou, Selecting Less
Corruptible Bureaucrats: A Quasi-Auction Approach 29 (Tinbergen Inst. Discussion
Paper No. 2007-096/1, 2007) (Neth.), available at http://www.tinbergen.nl/discussion
papers/07096.pdf (asserting that the first recorded auction of public offices was held by
Qin Shi Huang, first emperor of the Qin dynasty, and that the idea was adopted by many
Chinese emperors thereafter to solve financial problems).
9. 1 EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE 88
(Oliphant Smeaton ed., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1910) (1776); Keisling, supra note 8. The
practice of selling the office of emperor to the highest bidder began in 186 C.E. after the
Praetorian Guard gained total authority to make the choice. Fall of the Roman Empire,
ROME INFO (2009), http://www.rome.info/history/empire/fall/.
10. LINDA LEVY PECK, COURT PATRONAGE AND CORRUPTION IN EARLY STUART
ENGLAND 3–4 (1990); Keisling, supra note 8.
11. Keisling, supra note 8.
12. CARL RUSSELL FISH, THE CIVIL SERVICE AND THE PATRONAGE 19 (Russell &
Russell, Inc. 1963) (1904) (recounting Oliver Wolcott’s dismissal of Tench Coxe).
13. Id.
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who disliked the idea of patronage, nevertheless pragmatically replaced
Federalists with his own supporters.14 By the time William Henry Harrison
became president in 1841, more than 40,000 people came to Washington
hoping to fill one of 23,700 patronage jobs.15 Over the next decades, the
job of making tens of thousands of political appointments became more
and more burdensome for newly elected Presidents.16
When the number of positions was relatively small—about 5,000 in
1816—and the positions rather simple—postmasters and postal clerks,
land office surveyors and clerks, and customhouse workers17—the rotation
in office that resulted from patronage appointments was viewed as being
democratic.18 As the numbers increased, both employers and employees
became very dissatisfied. As Henry Clay wrote in 1829:
The members of [the official working corps] feel something like the
inhabitants of Cairo when the plague breaks out; no one knows who is next to
encounter the stroke of death; or which, with many of them is the same thing,
to be dismissed from office. You have no conception of the moral tyranny
which prevails here [in Washington] over those in employment.19

Congress finally reformed the system in response to the country’s
shock when, in 1881, President James Garfield, as he waited on the platform
for a train, was shot and killed by a disappointed job applicant.20
B. The Civil Service and the Pendleton Act
Congress’s response to the assassination and growing disenchantment
with the burdens of the patronage system as the federal workforce
became larger and larger was the enactment of the Pendleton Act of
1883.21 The Act prohibited removing classified workers on political or
religious grounds.22 It created the Civil Service Commission, with three
commissioners who would create rules for

14.
15.
16.
17.

Keisling, supra note 8.
Id.
See id.
RONALD N. JOHNSON & GARY D. LIBECAP, THE FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE SYSTEM
AND THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY 14–15 (1994), available at http://www.nber.org/
chapters/c8633.pdf.
18. Backgrounder on the Pendleton Act, U.S. EMBASSY, http://usa.usembassy.de/
etexts/democrac/28.htm (last visited Aug. 13, 2012).
19. THE WORKS OF HENRY CLAY: COMPRISING HIS LIFE, CORRESPONDENCE AND
SPEECHES 225 (Calvin Colton ed., 1904), available at http://ia600406.us.archive.org/20/
items/worksofhenry03clay/worksofhenry03clay.pdf.
20. Keisling, supra note 8.
21. Pendleton Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5 U.S.C.).
22. Ari Hoogenboom, The Pendleton Act and the Civil Service, 64 AM. HIST. REV.
301, 307 (1959).
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open, competitive examinations for testing the fitness of applicants for the
public service. . . . Such examinations shall be practical in their character,
and . . . will fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the persons examined
to discharge the duties of the service into which they seek to be appointed.
. . . [E]mployments . . . shall be filled by selections according to grade from
among those graded highest as the results of such competitive examinations.23

When the Act passed, only eleven percent of federal employees
were “classified,” or part of the new merit system.24 By 1900, forty-six
percent of federal government workers were classified civil service
employees.25 By 1922, about eighty percent of federal employees were in
the civil service merit system.26 By 2012, more than ninety percent of
the 2.7 million federal government civilian employees were part of the
civil service merit system.27 The Act’s merit requirements resulted in
government employees who were generally viewed as being better
educated and from higher social strata than past employees.28 No longer
would they be described as James Parton described them in his 1861
biography, Life of Andrew Jackson: “[T]he fact of a man’s holding office
under the government is presumptive evidence that he is one of three
characters, namely, an adventurer, an incompetent person, or a scoundrel.”29
The result was especially pleasing to businesspeople, who received
greatly improved service in post offices and customhouses.30 In addition
to receiving more efficient service, businesspeople also became more
politically powerful because it was their financial support of political
bosses that replaced the two-to-seven-percent assessments that had been
demanded of civil servants who had received patronage appointments.31

23. 22 Stat. at 403–04.
24. Hoogenboom, supra note 22, at 303.
25. Id.; see also FISH, supra note 12, at 229 (noting that by 1900 there were 90,000
classified positions and 100,000 unclassified positions in federal government, and total
salaries for classified were $75 million, for unclassified, only $30 million).
26. Olle Folke et al., Patronage and Elections in U.S. States, 105 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 567, 569 (2011).
27. The Gilded Age: Civil Service Reform, DIGITAL HIST. (2012), http://www.
digitalhistory.uh.edu/disp_textbook.cfm?smtID=2&psid=3115.
28. Hoogenboom, supra note 22, at 312.
29. 3 JAMES PARTON, LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 220 (1885).
30. Hoogenboom, supra note 22, at 316.
31. Id. at 302–03, 317.
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C. State and Local Civil Service Systems
One year after the passage of the Pendleton Act, New York became
the first state to enact a civil service system law for its state workers, and
Massachusetts became the second.32 But by 1936, only nine states had
enacted legislation creating a civil service system.33 So, in 1939, Congress
encouraged states to implement civil service systems by enacting
amendments to the Social Security Act that required states to establish
merit-based personnel standards for administering federal old-age
assistance plans.34 By 1970, about eighty percent of full-time state and
local government workers were part of civil service systems.35 As in the
federal government, the purpose of creating these systems was to create
a government workforce that was chosen on merit rather than by
political partisanship36 and that was protected from discrimination based
on religious or political reasons.37 The goal was “to promote efficiency
through a plan for selection and development of the best available staff,
weeding out the incompetent and promoting the outstanding.”38
D. Patronage or Civil Service: Which Is Better?
Civil service has been viewed as reforming the patronage system and
its evils of incompetence, lack of professionalism and continuity, nepotism,
partisanship, and corruption.39 Career civil servants are supposed to bring
to government competence and professionalism, continuity, predictability,
and neutrality.40
Nevertheless, which system is better is, perhaps, a trick question because
the answer depends in large measure on the context in which it is being

32. The Gilded Age: Civil Service Reform, supra note 27; see also Daniel D’Isidoro,
Note, The Massachusetts Civil Service Law: Is It Necessary To Destroy the Current
System In Order To Save It?, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1103, 1103 (2006).
33. Folke et al., supra note 26, at 569.
34. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 101(a)(5), 53
Stat. 1360, 1360.
35. Ann C. Hodges, The Interplay of Civil Service Law and Collective Bargaining
Law in Public Sector Employee Discipline Cases, 32 B.C. L. REV. 95, 101–02 (1990).
36. Id. at 102.
37. See, e.g., Civil Serv. Comm’n v. City of New Orleans, 854 So. 2d 322, 328
(La. 2003) (discussing New Orleans’s civil service system).
38. Albert H. Aronson, Merit System Objectives and Realities, SOC. SECURITY
BULL., Apr. 1950, at 3, 3 (authored by Director, State Merit System Services, Office of
Federal-State Relations, Federal Security Agency).
39. Merilee S. Grindle, Constructing, Deconstructing, and Reconstructing Career
Civil Service Systems in Latin America 19 (Harvard Kennedy Sch. Faculty Research
Working Paper Series, Paper No. RWP10–025, 2010), available at http://web.hks.harvard.
edu/publications/workingpapers/citation.aspx?PubId=7341.
40. Id.
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asked. For example, commentators of different eras have focused on
different factors in attempting to respond. Fewer than twenty years after
the enactment of the Pendleton Act, Carl Russell Fish, a professor at the
University of Wisconsin, noted that the speculative nature of the old
patronage system afforded opportunities that “attracted clever, sometimes
brilliant, men.”41 In contrast, the then-new civil service system offered
“the advantage of steady, light employment at a moderate remuneration
and attract[ed] the steady-going and unimaginative . . . who ha[d] no
better financial opportunities.”42 Professor Fish believed that if civil
service jobs had no special inducements, such as opportunities for travel
or research, “able young men” would not be tempted away from equivalent
business opportunities.43 He also concluded that because “college men”
did not do better on civil service exams than those with elementary
school or high school educations, “many of the college-bred men who
applied were of inferior capacity.”44
On the other hand, Ari Hoogenboom, a professor at the City University of
New York-Brooklyn College, wrote convincingly in 1959 about the
“motley group of individuals” who, before the passage of the Pendleton
Act, were given jobs in the federal government for which they were
clearly unqualified.45 He described “misfits employed on a temporary
basis” who had low morale, little professionalism, and a constant fear of
losing their jobs.46
In 1994, Professors Ronald N. Johnson of Montana State University
and Gary D. Libecap of the University of Arizona focused on the
increased size of the federal labor force as the major reason for adopting
a civil service merit system.47 They argued that if labor management had
not become a problem, then demand for greater professionalism in the
ranks of appointees could have been achieved by giving proficiency tests
to patronage appointees.48
More recently, Professor David E. Lewis of Princeton University,
after concluding that there is no consensus about whether patronage
appointees or merit civil servants are better for conducting federal
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

FISH, supra note 12, at 233.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 234.
Hoogenboom, supra note 22, at 301.
Id. at 302–03.
JOHNSON & LIBECAP, supra note 17, at 37.
Id. at 39.
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government business, did a study of federal program performance to
analyze its relationship to the two kinds of employees.49 He used scores
on the Bush Administration’s Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART)
to assess federal program performance and concluded that programs
administered by patronage appointees received lower PART evaluations
than those run by civil service workers.50 The patronage appointees did
have more education and business experience, but those factors were not
correlated with program performance.51 The chief factor that may
explain the greater success of civil service workers is the likelihood that
they have more experience, both in length and depth, in the specific area
they are administering.52 Professor Lewis concluded that government
program performance could be improved by creating just the right balance
between patronage appointees, who carry out the democratic will of the
people, and civil service workers, who carry out the competent, ongoing
functions of their agencies, without the one eroding the value of the
other.53
Part of the problem in achieving that balance is that civil service
systems, although correcting some of the faults of patronage systems,
can become mired in their own inefficiencies. In protecting government
employees from political partisanship, civil service regulations can make
it very difficult to dismiss incompetent performers or to reward the
meritorious sufficiently.54 Compounding those difficulties are strategies
government administrators use to blunt their effects. One such strategy
is the use of provisional appointments to hire applicants who are not on
civil service exam lists.55 More than sixty years ago, some states routinely
hired non-civil-service-exam “provisional” employees as permanent
staff members.56 In Massachusetts, for example, provisionals may serve
for only up to one year, but that rule was not enforced, and by 2000 an
estimated forty percent of state employees were hired outside the civil
service system.57 A federal administrator has noted that the “caliber of

49. David E. Lewis, Testing Pendleton’s Premise: Do Political Appointees Make
Worse Bureaucrats?, 69 J. POL. 1073, 1074 (2007).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1083.
53. Id. at 1086.
54. Nancy Buonanno Grennan, A Legal Roadmap to Privatizing Government Services
in Washington State, 72 WASH. L. REV. 153, 156 (1997).
55. See, e.g., D’Isidoro, supra note 32, at 1133.
56. Aronson, supra note 38, at 6.
57. Jonathan Walters, Toward a High-Performance Workplace: Fixing Civil Service in
Massachusetts, at v (Pioneer Inst. for Pub. Policy Research, White Paper No. 13, 2000),
available at http://www.pioneerinstitute.org/pdf/wp13.pdf. In New York State, the
provisional rate is less than one percent. Id. at 5.
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provisional employees has often been lower than that of a random sample
of the applicants and seriously lower than that of the better candidates.”58
Another statutory limitation on a merit-based civil service system is an
absolute preference given to particular groups so that they must be hired
ahead of others scoring higher on civil service exams. Among the groups
receiving preferences in some states are veterans, children of police officers
and firefighters killed in the line of duty, police officers and firefighters
permanently disabled in the line of duty, and winners of governmental
honors.59
Two commentators whose ideas achieved great popularity in the
1990s argued that the civil service personnel system was one of the most
destructive government programs.60 They asserted that government
managers become stuck with civil service workers whom they cannot
manage appropriately regarding promotion, dismissal, and compensation.61
Many analysts have offered a variety of reforms to address the perceived
weaknesses of civil service systems, such as promoting and dismissing
based on performance rather than seniority, using performance-based
and market-based salary scales, and bypassing the civil service system to
recruit and hire the “best people.”62
The purpose of this Article is not to find that perfect balance between
patronage appointees and civil service employees to achieve maximum
performance but to suggest how workers should be characterized as
falling into one group or the other so that their legal rights are transparent
and without the ambiguities that result in a multitude of lawsuits every
time an opposition administration takes office. The new administration
will fire the prior administration’s patronage appointees because they
belong to the opposition party, and the fired workers will sue, claiming

58. Aronson, supra note 38, at 6.
59. See, e.g., Walters, supra note 57, at 4 (citing MASS GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 31,
§ 26 (West 2001)); Bruce Mohl, No Easy Patronage Cure, COMMONWEALTH MAG.
(Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.commonwealthmagazine.org/News-and-Features/Features/
2011/Spring/No-easy-patronage-cure.aspx.
60. DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT: HOW THE
ENTREPRENEURIAL SPIRIT IS TRANSFORMING THE PUBLIC SECTOR 124 (1992).
61. Id. at 125–27. Some commentators have quoted an old saying: “Government
workers are like headless nails: you can get them in, but you can’t get them out.” Id. at
126; see also Pat Hardy, Civil Service: Some Pros, Cons and Suggestions for Reform 5
(Univ. of Tenn. Mun. Technical Advisory Serv. Knowledgebase Series, 2006), available
at http://www.mtas.tennessee.edu/KnowledgeBase.nsf/0/667E2DAC7E73DEC88525723
B0059C0A9?OpenDocument.
62. Hardy, supra note 61, at 7.
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that their constitutional rights have been violated. In three cases decided
between 1976 and 1990, the U.S. Supreme Court determined what those
legal rights are with respect to hiring, promotion, transfer, recall, and
dismissal.63 It would seem that with more than twenty years of appellate
cases interpreting the Supreme Court decisions, the issues would have
been decided, government employers would know what is required of
them in dealing with patronage employees, and litigation would have
diminished to an occasional trickle. Nevertheless, the opinions continue
to give rise to lawsuits.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF PATRONAGE APPOINTEES
A. Elrod v. Burns
The 1976 case, Elrod v. Burns,64 involved Republican plaintiffs who
had been non-civil-service employees of the Cook County, Illinois Sheriff’s
Office.65 When Richard Elrod, a Democrat, replaced a Republican as
Sheriff of Cook County, he followed past practice and fired the plaintiffs
because they were Republicans.66 The U.S. Supreme Court held that
patronage dismissals are unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments because they “severely restrict political belief and
association.” 67
The Court, however, carved out one exception, permitting patronage
dismissals of people in policymaking positions who would be able to
“obstruct[] the implementation of policies of the new administration,
policies presumably sanctioned by the electorate.”68 Foreshadowing the
myriad of lawsuits resulting from this opinion, the Court noted that “[n]o
clear line can be drawn between policymaking and nonpolicymaking
positions.”69 But the opinion suggested that “[a]n employee with
responsibilities that are not well defined or are of broad scope more
likely functions in a policymaking position,” as would an employee who
“acts as an adviser or formulates plans for the implementation of broad
goals.”70 In his concurrence, Justice Stewart referred to constitutional
protection for nonpolicymaking and nonconfidential patronage employees,71

63. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445
U.S. 507 (1980); Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (plurality opinion).
64. 427 U.S. 347.
65. Id. at 350.
66. Id. at 351.
67. Id. at 372–73.
68. Id. at 367.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 368.
71. Id. at 375 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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and that expansion of the exception to “confidants” has generally been
accepted.72 Justice Stewart did not, however, define who those employees
might be.73
B. Branti v. Finkel
Four years later, in a case involving two Republican assistant public
defenders who were dismissed by the newly elected Democratic Public
Defender, the Court reaffirmed its Elrod holding that patronage
dismissals violate the First Amendment protection for private political
beliefs.74 The Court also reaffirmed the Elrod exception, adding that
patronage dismissals are acceptable for some jobs because “First
Amendment rights may be required to yield to the State’s vital interest in
maintaining governmental effectiveness and efficiency.”75
The most important outcome of the Branti decision that affected the
course of litigation following political party changes in administrations
was a new description for the patronage employees who fall into the
exception and may be dismissed for their politics. Merely designating
someone as a policymaker or a confidant was no longer sufficient; the
test became whether party affiliation was an appropriate requirement for
effective job performance.76 A policymaker or confidant may or may
not pass that test. Both Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, and Justice
Powell, in dissent, acknowledged the difficulty government employers
and lower courts would have in deciding whether an employee in a
specific government job fell within the “dismissable” category or not.77
C. Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois
Besides creating the problem of differentiating between protected and
unprotected jobs, the Elrod/Branti decisions did not address the issue of
adverse personnel decisions other than dismissal. In 1990, in Rutan v.
Republican Party of Illinois,78 the Supreme Court extended the
72. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517–18 (1980).
73. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 374–75 (Stewart, J., concurring).
74. Branti, 445 U.S. at 516–17.
75. Id. at 517. The Court in Elrod had said that effectiveness and efficiency
arguments could not support patronage dismissals because it is unlikely that belonging to
a particular political party would motivate poor performance. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 365.
76. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518.
77. Id.; id. at 524 (Powell, J., dissenting).
78. 497 U.S. 62 (1990).
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Elrod/Branti holdings to promotion, transfer, recall, and hiring
decisions.79 In this case it was not in dispute that all the plaintiffs held
protected positions, so the Court did not discuss how one decides
whether an employee serves in a protected position or not, other than to
note that Elrod created an exception that allowed patronage dismissals
for policymakers and confidants and that Branti refined that exception to
include only those employees in jobs for which party affiliation is an
appropriate requirement for effective performance.80
D. Circuit Court Interpretations
1. Early Circuit Court Decisions Following Elrod/Branti/Rutan
In the 1980s and early 1990s lower courts were faced with many cases
in which patronage appointees claimed that negative employment actions
were taken against them in violation of their constitutional rights. Cases
that were “easy” involved the dismissals of employees with jobs like
cleaning person or waiter.81 In those cases, it was clear that the job was
neither policymaking nor confidential and that party affiliation was not
an appropriate requirement for the job.82 Most cases involving
government lawyers or directors of public information were also easy
because those were clearly policymaking or confidential jobs, and courts
found a requirement of party affiliation to be appropriate.83
So many cases arose, however, because most descriptions of actual
duties performed by the plaintiff employees made it difficult to tell
whether their jobs required particular party affiliations and, therefore,
whether or not they were protected.84 In response, some lower courts
created tests with criteria they could apply to determine on which side of

79. Id. at 65, 78.
80. Id. at 71 n.5.
81. See, e.g., Vazquez Rios v. Hernandez Colon, 819 F.2d 319, 324–25 (1st Cir.
1987) (holding that cleaning women, waiters, and a domestic services supervisor employed at
a governor’s mansion were not “‘confidential’ public employee[s]” and were therefore
protected against politically motivated discharge).
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., Brown v. Trench, 787 F.2d 167, 169–70 (3d Cir. 1986) (holding that
the politically motivated dismissal of a county’s assistant director of public information
was constitutional); Livas v. Petka, 711 F.2d 798, 800–01 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that
the politically motivated dismissal of an assistant state’s attorney was constitutional).
But see Tavano v. Cnty. of Niagara, 621 F. Supp. 345, 350 (W.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding
that an assistant county attorney’s political affiliation was irrelevant to effective
discharge of duties in family court), aff’d, 800 F.2d 1128 (2d Cir. 1986).
84. See Susan Lorde Martin, A Decade of Branti Decisions: A Government
Official’s Guide to Patronage Dismissals, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 43–47 (1989) (listing
protected and unprotected positions as determined in court decisions).
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the protection barrier each job fell.85 After Rutan, lower courts also had
to decide whether actions other than firing, hiring, promoting, transferring,
refusing to transfer, and failing to rehire were sufficiently severe
deprivations to “press state employees and applicants to conform their
beliefs and associations to some state-selected orthodoxy.”86 Once
again, some courts created tests to determine whether specific negative
employment actions were severe enough to pressure employees to
change their political views or affiliations, or so minor that employees
could be expected to bear them with relative equanimity.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit decided many of the
early patronage employment cases.87 In doing so, the court devised a
two-step test to determine whether party affiliation was an appropriate
requirement for efficient job performance. First, the court would determine
whether the position from which the plaintiff-employee was dismissed
involved “decisionmaking on issues where there is room for political
disagreement on goals or their implementation.”88 Second, if the answer
to the first part was “yes,” then the court would examine the particular
duties of the position’s job description to determine if the position was
that of a policymaker, confidant, communicator, or other whose function
made party affiliation an appropriate requirement.89 If the answer to the
second part was “yes,” then the employee fell under the Elrod/Branti
exception, did not have First Amendment protection, and could be
dismissed for his or her political affiliation.90 The Fourth Circuit also
adopted this test.91
While Rutan was pending, the First Circuit also devised a test to
determine what kind of job actions infringed employees’ First Amendment
rights. Infringement occurs “when the employer’s challenged actions
result in a work situation ‘unreasonably inferior’ to the norm for that
position.”92 The court offered examples of when its standard would not
85. See, e.g., Jimenez Fuentes v. Torres Gaztambide, 807 F.2d 236, 241–42 (1st
Cir. 1986) (en banc) (surveying test employed in numerous cases from various jurisdictions).
86. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 75 (1990).
87. See, e.g., Vazquez Rios, 819 F.2d at 320. Many of the cases arose out of the
change in administrations after the 1984 gubernatorial election in Puerto Rico. Id.
88. Jimenez Fuentes, 807 F.2d at 241–42. The court’s emphasis was on the duties
in the job description of the position itself, not on the duties in fact performed by the
person who held the position. Id. at 242.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 241–42.
91. Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134, 141–42 (4th Cir. 1990).
92. Agosto-de-Feliciano v. Aponte-Roque, 889 F.2d 1209, 1218 (1st Cir. 1989).
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be met by plaintiffs, reflecting its view that the government should be
given some leeway in excluding those with different political affiliations
from policymaking and independently performed tasks.93 The court also
determined that plaintiffs would have to prove that their work conditions
were unreasonably inferior by clear and convincing evidence.94 This
very high standard of proof allowed government officials to make policy
and implement it as voters presumably elected them to do.95 On the
other hand, if plaintiffs met this standard, they would then have to prove
by a mere preponderance of the evidence that the negative changes in
their working conditions or responsibilities were caused by their political
affiliations.96 This low standard of proof was designed to preserve the
employees’ First Amendment rights.97
The Seventh Circuit’s test to determine whether or not a government
employee could be dismissed for political reasons focuses on whether
the particular position allows “room for principled disagreement on goals or
their implementation” and meaningful input into the decisionmaking
process. 98 Factors that the court listed as indicative of a position’s
authorization for decisionmaking input included responsibility for many
employees, high salary, and broad duties.99
The Seventh Circuit has also held that although a statutory assertion
that a particular job is a policymaking one is not absolutely determinative,
statements by a state legislature to that effect are “entitled to great
weight.”100
Similarly, the Fourth Circuit concluded more than twenty years ago
that when governors designate jobs as exempt from civil service law,
they create a presumption that adverse employment actions may be taken
against those job holders solely because of political affiliation.101 The
court was skeptical about having courts make decisions about whether
93. Id. at 1219. Among those employer actions that are permissible: removing an
employee’s perks; removing some responsibilities and excluding an employee from
policymaking meetings, but allowing the employee to keep supervisory authority; requiring
an employee to report to others instead of working independently; and temporarily
assigning inferior tasks to an employee. Id.
94. Id. at 1220.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Tomczak v. City of Chicago, 765 F.2d 633, 641 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting
Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164, 1170 (7th Cir. 1981)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
99. Id. at 642.
100. Lohorn v. Michal, 913 F.2d 327, 334 (7th Cir. 1990) (citing IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 36-8-3-4(m), 36-8-1-12 (West 2006)) (stating that an assistant chief of police holds an
upper level policymaking position and is therefore exempt from procedural requirements
for dismissal, demotion, or discipline).
101. Stott v. Haworth, 916 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 1990).
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particular government positions should be part of the merit system or
part of the political patronage system.102
2. Recent Federal Court Decisions Arising from Elrod/Branti/Rutan
It has been more than thirty-five years since the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Elrod v. Burns, and yet there have been more than three hundred
reported court opinions in patronage employment cases in the last five
years. Some of the early patronage employment cases arose out of the
1984 gubernatorial election in Puerto Rico and were decided by the First
Circuit.103 One might think that at least those kinds of cases would have
been resolved, and yet, in 2011, the First Circuit had to decide cases with
the same issues arising out of the 2008 election of Puerto Rico’s
Governor. In one of the early cases, Vazquez Rios v. Hernandez Colon,
the First Circuit held that cleaning workers, janitors, and supervisors in
the governor’s mansion were protected from patronage dismissals.104
Twenty-four years later, the court had to decide, once again, whether
maintenance and domestic workers in the governor’s mansion were
unconstitutionally terminated because of their membership in the
Popular Democratic Party.105 In 2011, the First Circuit was presented
with a similar case in which the plaintiff was discharged from her job as
a receptionist in an annex of the governor’s mansion when the
governorship changed political parties.106 Patronage employment cases
were also litigated after the 2000 gubernatorial elections in Puerto
Rico.107 Even employment situations that would seem to have been
settled in the courts keep arising in new litigation.
102. Id. at 141.
103. See, e.g., Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1989);
Figueroa-Rodriguez v. Lopez-Rivera, 878 F.2d 1488 (1st Cir. 1988); Donate-Romero v.
Colorado, 856 F.2d 384 (1st Cir. 1988); Santiago-Correa v. Hernandez-Colon, 835 F.2d
395 (1st Cir. 1987); Vazquez Rios v. Hernandez Colon, 819 F.2d 319, 320 (1st Cir.
1987).
104. 819 F.2d at 321–23.
105. Ocasio-Hernández v. Fortuño-Burset, 640 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011). The court
stated that the employees had not held policymaking positions, did not have access to
confidential information about policy, and pleaded adequate facts that their political
affiliations were in opposition to their employers, that their employers knew it, and that
their affiliations were the cause of their dismissals. Id. at 6–8.
106. Peñalbert-Rosa v. Fortuño-Burset, 631 F.3d 592 (1st Cir. 2011).
107. See, e.g., Cortés-Reyes v. Salas-Quintana, 608 F.3d 41, 45 (1st Cir. 2010)
(holding that the political affiliation First Amendment rights of ranger cadets of the
Puerto Rico Department of Natural and Environmental Resources were violated); Torres-
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In 1988, the Eleventh Circuit held in Ray v. City of Leeds that a director
of social services for the city was subject to discharge for political
reasons.108 The court reasoned that because the position required decisions
about the allocation of scarce resources, it was a policymaking position.109
Therefore, political affiliation was an appropriate job requirement, and
the social services director was not entitled to First Amendment protection
from dismissal.110
Twenty or more years later, the Fourth Circuit decided cases about
directors and assistant directors of social services, and those cases are
highly illustrative of why prior job classification should be determinative
of the constitutional protections the position deserves. In Nader v. Blair,
the court concluded that an assistant director of the Baltimore
Department of Social Services was a policymaker, noting that Maryland
law gives the person in that position power to shape local policy and
specifically states that that position was one from which an employee
could be dismissed “for any reason, solely in the discretion of the
appointing authority.”111 The following year in Fields v. Prater, the
court held that an applicant for the position of director of a county
department of social services in Virginia could not be refused the job
based on her political affiliation because, under Virginia law, local
directors do not have significant policymaking authority.112 The court
noted that the local director position was specifically designated as “nonpartisan,” and the job application form the plaintiff filled out stated that
political affiliation would not be taken into account in hiring.113 The
court acknowledged that it considered how the state classified a particular

Martínez v. P.R. Dep’t of Corr., 485 F.3d 19, 22–23 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding political
affiliation First Amendment rights of a Department of Corrections worker were not
violated because she did not show that her working conditions were “‘unreasonably
inferior’ to the norm for that position” (quoting Rosario-Urdaz v. Velazco, 433 F.3d 174,
178 (1st Cir. 2006))).
108. 837 F.2d 1542, 1544 (11th Cir. 1988).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1544–45.
111. 549 F.3d 953, 956–62 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. &
PENS. § 11-305 (Supp. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Freebery v.
Coons, 355 F. App’x 645, 649 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that a general manager of the
Department of Special Services in Delaware could not demonstrate that his position did
not require political affiliation and he was therefore not constitutionally protected from
termination).
112. 566 F.3d 381, 386 (4th Cir. 2009). For a detailed description of the case, see
generally Joshua J. Miller, Recent Decisions, Fields v. Prater: The Fourth Circuit’s Lost
Opportunity To Further Define the Boundaries of Political Patronage in Public Employment,
69 MD. L. REV. 756 (2010).
113. Fields, 566 F.3d at 388.
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position, although it would not consider the classification “dispositive of
the constitutional issue.”114
In 2009, the Fourth Circuit admitted that applying the 1980 Branti
decision was “conflicting and confusing,”115 and that “it is not always
easy to say that there is a clearly drawn line between those positions for
which consideration of political affiliation is allowed and those for
which it is not.”116 It is not reasonable that after thirty years the problem
is still so difficult for government officials and courts. Taxpayers are
not getting the efficient government they deserve when so much time
and so many resources are spent on relitigating the same issues every
time public offices change political parties. These suits get very little
attention in the media, so newly elected politicians do not have bad
publicity as an incentive for avoiding them. Personal liability is also
often not a disincentive because governments often provide insurance
for civil liability damages to protect public officials and employees even
in their individual capacities.117 In fact, because the law is still so unclear,
courts continue to hold in many patronage employment cases that
government employers have qualified immunity and, therefore, are not
liable for violating employees’ First Amendment rights.118 In 2010, the
Seventh Circuit asserted that “[g]iven the uncertainty that litigants
encounter in this somewhat murky area of the law, it is difficult for a

114. Id.
115. Id. at 389 (quoting Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1160 (4th Cir. 1996))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id.
117. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 160A-485 (2009) (providing authorization for
cities and counties to provide insurance for themselves and any of their employees against
civil liability for damages, including employees sued in their individual capacities);
Anita R. Brown-Graham, Civil Liability of the Local Government and Its Officials and
Employees, in COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN NORTH CAROLINA art. 12, at 18
(2008), available at http://sogpubs.unc.edu/cmg/cmg12.pdf.
118. See, e.g., Moss v. Martin, 614 F.3d 707, 712 (7th Cir. 2010); Randall v. Scott,
610 F.3d 701, 716 (11th Cir. 2010); Cortés-Reyes v. Salas-Quintana, 608 F.3d 41, 51–53
(1st Cir. 2010); Fields, 566 F.3d at 389; Peterson v. Dean, No. 3:09-cv-628, 2010 WL
5184794, at *8–9 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 14, 2010). Government officials may receive a qualified
immunity from liability when performing discretionary functions if their conduct “does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights about which a reasonable
person would have known” at the time the action took place. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457
U.S. 800, 818 (1982). For a discussion of the qualified immunity concept and problems
arising from its current formulation, see generally John C. Jeffries, Jr., What’s Wrong
With Qualified Immunity?, 62 FLA. L. REV. 851 (2010).
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plaintiff to avoid a qualified immunity defense in a case of first impression
unless she occupies a low rung on the bureaucratic ladder.”119
A Ninth Circuit case provides another illustration of the difficulty in
knowing what the law requires in many of these cases. In Diruzza v.
County of Tehama, the circuit court reversed a decision of the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of California in which the lower
court granted a summary judgment motion by the county, sheriff, and
undersheriff defendants accused by a former deputy sheriff of violating
her First Amendment rights by firing her because of her political support
for the sheriff’s opponent.120 The district court was guided by cases in
North Carolina, Alabama, and Illinois in which deputy sheriffs were
deemed policymakers subject to termination for their political affiliations.121
The Ninth Circuit concluded, however, that a blanket rule about deputy
sheriffs was not appropriate.122
First, the Ninth Circuit cited cases in three other circuits in which
political affiliation was deemed not an appropriate job requirement for
deputy sheriffs.123 Then the court noted that even in the cases cited by
the district court, the decisions were not based on the job title of “deputy
sheriff,” but rather on the actual functions performed by people holding
that position.124 The court concluded that under California law the title
“deputy sheriff” did not clearly indicate job responsibilities; there were
deputies who were high-level employees and deputies who were lowlevel employees and, therefore, the district court had to make an individual
assessment about whether or not the plaintiff’s duties established her as
a policymaker for whom political affiliation was an appropriate
requirement.125
A Tenth Circuit case, Poindexter v. Board of County Commissioners,
similarly involved the problem of determining from a job title what the
job holder’s actual duties were.126 The position at issue was that of road

119. Moss, 614 F.3d at 712 (emphasis added). But see Gann v. Cline, 519 F.3d
1090, 1093 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that a county commissioner was not entitled to qualified
immunity because it was clearly established that “[d]iscrimination based on political
non-affiliation is just as actionable as discrimination based on political affiliation”).
120. 206 F.3d 1304, 1315 (9th Cir. 2000).
121. Id. at 1309 (citing Jenkins v. Medford, 119 F.3d 1156, 1156 (4th Cir. 1997);
Upton v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 1209, 1218 (7th Cir. 1991); and Terry v. Cook, 866 F.2d
373, 373 (11th Cir. 1989)).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1311 (citing Hall v. Tollett, 128 F.3d 418, 429 (6th Cir. 1997); Burns v.
Cnty. of Cambria, 971 F.2d 1015, 1022 (3d Cir. 1992); and Dickeson v. Quarberg, 844
F.2d 1435, 1443–44 (10th Cir. 1988)).
124. Id. at 1311–12.
125. Id. at 1312–13.
126. Poindexter v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 548 F.3d 916, 920 (10th Cir. 2008).
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foreman in an Oklahoma county.127 The court held that the plaintiff’s
First Amendment rights were not violated when he was demoted in favor
of the county commissioner’s political supporter because the position of
road foreman had a “significant political dimension and sufficient
discretionary authority.”128 The court cited other circuit courts that had
come to similar conclusions.129 Most telling about the confusion rampant in
these cases was the Tenth Circuit’s description of a Fifth Circuit case,
Wiggins v. Lowndes County.130 In that case, the court concluded that a
road foreman did not have policymaking or discretionary duties and did
not require confidentiality and, therefore, political affiliation was not an
appropriate requirement for the job.131 What distinguished Wiggins from
Poindexter was that Wiggins involved a road foreman in Mississippi,
where there was also the more senior position of road manager.132 The
Tenth Circuit concluded that an Oklahoma road foreman held a position
similar to a Mississippi road manager, not a Mississippi road foreman.133
The following brief descriptions of cases before courts throughout the
United States within the last five years suggest that the current system of
protecting workers is not working for government employees, who may
have been treated wrongfully, for government employers, who may be
sued wrongfully, or for taxpayers, who have to fund continual litigation
on these issues. First, in Indiana, plaintiffs who held positions as an
entry-level garbage man, dump truck driver, snow plower, and facility
cleaner sued the city and the mayor for retaliating against them for their
political activities by not rehiring them after they were terminated to cut
costs.134 Next, in New York, the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York held that the mayor could fire the plaintiff city fire
commissioner for his political associations because the fire commissioner
was a policymaker.135 Finally, in Tennessee, the U.S. District Court for
the Middle District of Tennessee held that election commission members
127. Id. at 918.
128. Id. at 920.
129. Id. at 920–21 (citing Langley v. Hot Spring Cnty., 393 F.3d 814, 818 (8th Cir.
2005); Gentry v. Lowndes Cnty., 337 F.3d 481, 487 (5th Cir. 2003); and Hoard v.
Sizemore, 198 F.3d 205, 213–14 (6th Cir. 1999)).
130. Id. at 921 (citing Wiggins v. Lowndes Cnty., 363 F.3d 387 (5th Cir. 2004)).
131. Id. (citing Wiggins, 363 F.3d at 389–90).
132. Id. (citing Wiggins, 363 F.3d at 390).
133. Id.
134. Cochran v. City of Huntington, No. Civ. 1:05-CV-249-TLS, 2006 WL
2855200, at *1–3 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 29, 2006).
135. Cicchetti v. Davis, 607 F. Supp. 2d 575, 580 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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were entitled to qualified immunity when they were sued by county
administrators of elections who had been terminated allegedly because
of their political party affiliation.136 The court asserted that “[i]n fact,
the only thing clear now is that the law on [whether the position of
administrator of elections was one to which political affiliation lacked a
valid relation] remains unclear.”137
IV. SOLVING THE PATRONAGE LITIGATION MESS
It is surprising and, particularly in poor economic times, burdensome
on taxpayers that governmental resources have to be used year after year
on these same cases. Clearly, the current state of the law makes the
courts a very inefficient place to resolve these patronage employment
issues. It just is not working.
Patronage employees and their political party bosses should not be
able to have it both ways: receiving patronage jobs based on political
connections, not on merit, but being protected from adverse politically
motivated employment actions including dismissal, as though they were
civil service workers. There has been much discussion about whether
the patronage system or the civil service system is better at serving the
interests of the citizen-taxpayer, and a reasonable conclusion is that
some combination is probably best, but it is unreasonable to think that
the best combination is patronage for hiring and civil service for firing.
That arrangement results in governments hiring employees who are not
necessarily qualified for their responsibilities, having a difficult time
firing them, and then having a good chance of incurring litigation expenses
for doing so. This arrangement is tilted much too far in the direction of the
patronage employee—but, oddly enough, away from political organizations
that cannot get rid of holdover patronage employees from a prior
administration—and away from the expertise and efficiency that is in the
interest of the citizen-taxpayer.
Perhaps it is time for the Supreme Court to revisit its Elrod/Branti/Rutan
decisions. If it did, there is a good chance that the outcome would
change the law and eliminate many of these patronage employment
cases. None of the five Justices who were in the majority in Rutan
remains on the Court.138 Two of the four dissenters, Justices Scalia and
Kennedy, are currently on the Court.139 In the Court’s 2009–2010 term,
136. Peterson v. Dean, No. 3:09-cv-628, 2010 WL 5184794, at *16 (M.D. Tenn.
Dec. 14, 2010).
137. Id. at *9.
138. Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 64 (1990) (Brennan, White,
Marshall, Blackmun, & Stevens, JJ., in majority).
139. Id. (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., Kennedy & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting).
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Justices Scalia and Thomas voted together ninety-two percent of the
time.140 Justice Kennedy was in the majority ninety-three percent of the
time.141 The same was true for Justice Kennedy during the 2008–2009
term.142 Since the 2005–2006 term, Justice Kennedy “has been in the
majority in more five-to-four decisions than any other Justice,” and in
those decisions he has sided with the conservatives—currently Chief
Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito—more than twice
as often as with the liberals.143
In light of the foregoing statistics and with more than twenty years of
hindsight, parts of Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Rutan are still
true and instructive.144 Justice Scalia noted then that it “is anybody’s
guess” what is meant by asking whether “party affiliation is an appropriate
requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.”145
He also observed that the circuit courts devised a variety of tests for
figuring it out, but the formulations “are still so general that for most
positions it is impossible to know whether party affiliation is a
permissible requirement until a court renders its decision.”146
A few years later, the Sixth Circuit did devise a test for identifying
some positions that would never receive First Amendment protection:
positions that a statute specifically designates as having a patronage
exception, positions that have discretionary authority, positions that
involve confidential advising, and positions filled specifically for balancing
out party representation.147 The Sixth Circuit has also routinely given
presumptive deference to state legislatures when they determine that a
position is not political and therefore entitled to First Amendment
protection from adverse employment decisions.148 Nevertheless,
Justice Scalia’s observation about the uselessness of such tests is borne
out by recent cases within the Sixth Circuit.

140. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Roberts Court and Freedom of Speech, 63 FED. COMM.
L.J. 579, 580 (2011).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 580–81.
143. Id. at 581.
144. Rutan, 497 U.S. at 92–115.
145. Id. at 111 (quoting Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980)).
146. Id.
147. McCloud v. Testa, 97 F.3d 1536, 1557 (6th Cir. 1996).
148. See, e.g., Back v. Hall, 537 F.3d 552, 556 (6th Cir. 2008); Rice v. Ohio Dep’t
of Transp., 14 F.3d 1133, 1143 (6th Cir. 1994).
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For example, in 2011, the Sixth Circuit heard a case in which the
plaintiff, a former town director of constituent services, sued the town
and the town’s supervisor for violating his First Amendment political
association rights when she fired him, allegedly because of his support
for the supervisor’s political opponent in the last election.149 The court
had to decide whether the employee’s position was entitled to an
Elrod/Branti exemption from First Amendment protection because
political affiliation was a requirement for effective job performance.150
In the opinion, the court used the term “unclear” ten times.151 For instance,
it was “unclear whether the Township distinguishes between political
and nonpolitical employees, or whether some or all of the Township’s
employees are considered to be part of the civil service.”152 It was also
“unclear whether . . . the Director served as a confidential employee,”
and it was “unclear about how much authority, if any, the Director had to
implement or craft public policy.”153 Because of all the factual ambiguity,
the court declined to grant summary judgment to the defendant supervisor
based on a qualified immunity defense.154 If, after thirty-five years of
the right being recognized for government employees to be protected
from employment retaliation for choosing and acting on their political
affiliation, courts still have a difficult time determining to whom that
right applies, it is clear that the process is not working.
An example of a position that should have been but was not part of the
New York civil service system was at issue in the 2010 Second Circuit
case of Morin v. Tormey.155 The plaintiff, Bobette Morin, had been chief
clerk of the Onondaga County Family Court since 1994, when she was
appointed by a statewide panel of five people.156 New York law specifically
prohibited her from engaging in political activity at work.157 When
Morin refused to engage in political activities at the behest of the district
administrative judge, she was demoted and forced to give up her position
149. O’Connor v. Twp. of Redford, 428 F. App’x 600, 601–03 (6th Cir. 2011).
150. Id. at 604–05.
151. Id. at 603–08, 608 n.1. The court also used the terms “not clearly defined,” id.
at 606, “vague,” id., “not even clear,” id., “ambiguous,” id. at 607, “lack of clarity,” id., and
“ill-defined,”id. at 608.
152. Id. at 606.
153. Id. at 607.
154. Id. at 608; see also Wuopio v. Brandon Bd. of Educ., No. 08-11371, 2009 WL
2872718, at *7 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 2, 2009) (holding that a school district did not satisfy
its burden of proving that the plaintiff was a confidential or policymaking employee and
denying summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds).
155. 626 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 2010).
156. Complaint with Jury Demand at 6, Morin, 626 F.3d 40 (No. 5:07-cv-00517DNH-GJD).
157. Morin, 626 F.3d at 45–46 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22,
§ 50.1(III)(B) (2011)).
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as chief clerk.158 She sued the judge and others at the court, claiming that
she was not a policymaker and therefore could not be demoted as a result of
her refusal to engage in political activity.159 The Second Circuit agreed and
concluded that she was entitled to First Amendment protection.160
Three-and-a-half years of ongoing litigation—costing taxpayers litigation
expenses and distracting a district administrative judge, a second judge,
an executive assistant to the administrative judge, and a law clerk to the
second judge—could have been avoided if Morin’s position had been
part of the civil service system. If she cannot be fired or demoted
because of her political actions or lack of political actions, then keeping
her position outside the civil service system is not serving the usual
patronage purpose of providing support for a political party. Her
position is merely creating ambiguity and litigation.
V. CONCLUSION
As a practical matter, someone who receives a government job from a
political patron, whether policymaking or menial, would feel a sense of
loyalty to that person and his or her political party. That, after all, is the
purpose of patronage—to create party loyalty. It therefore makes sense
that a political appointee in any job might try to sabotage or spy on an
incoming opposition administration. From that, it follows that the new
administration would want to clean house upon taking office.
The best solution for the citizen-taxpayer is to have patronage
employment positions be those for which, by definition, party affiliation
is a requirement for effective job performance, and for all other positions
to be part of civil service systems. Then the title, patronage or civil service,
would define the protections from adverse employment decisions to
which the employee would be entitled. All positions declared by courts
as protected should by state legislation become civil service jobs. Such
an arrangement would require the exertion of tremendous political will,
an extremely unlikely turn of events.
It is more likely that one of these cases will be appealed to the Supreme
Court, and the Court will overturn the Elrod/Branti/Rutan opinions
because the current formulation is unworkable. Instead, the Court might
conclude that it will respect the decisions made in the political process
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 42.
Id. 41–42.
Id. at 46.
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so that all workers in positions designated by elected officials as civil
service will have First Amendment protection against negative employment
decisions, whereas all other workers will be deemed to have patronage
appointments and will be subject to politically motivated dismissals,
demotions, and the like, just as their hiring was politically motivated.
With such an arrangement, each state, city, and town can devise for
itself the proper balance of civil service and patronage employees. Most
Elrod/Branti/Rutan litigation would be eliminated, a benefit for cashstrapped taxpayers. New administrations would not be saddled with
patronage appointees from opposition party administrations, better
reflecting the will of the electorate.
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